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Digital populism and 
disinformation in post-truth times 
 
Abstract 
This article presents an attempt to understand the relationship 
between digital populism and post-truth politics. At first, we will 
try to understand the fuzzy semantic category of populism. Next, 
we examine the growth of right-wing populism in Europe and its 
main characteristics. Finally, we analyze how the current model of 
networked communication, particularly direct communication, 
and the anatomy of digital social networks, become a fertile field 
for the dissemination of populist rhetoric, articulating the concept 




Digital populism, disinformation, post-truth. 
 
1. Populism: a state of the art 
The term “populist” is almost always used to describe a wide range of 
political actors, parties, and movements, from the left to the right, which 
structure their political strategy around a dualistic and simplifying 
conception of social reality. A semantic category of multiple variants, populism manufactures 
a Manichean discourse on social reality, based on the popular will to achieve power and to 
combat an enemy of the people, generally identified with the elite. It thrives in countries 
facing a crisis of the party system, with a low civic and democratic culture, or in countries 
that, although they have developed a stable party system, have failed in the process of 
mediation between politics and citizens, generating feelings of reprobation towards the 
dominant political class, nicknamed the elite or the caste. 
In fact, populism has become a prominent theme in the contemporary political scene. A 
phenomenon of different manifestations and variants, it can arise in the ideological spectrum 
of the left or the right, just as it can have different contents depending on the establishment 
against which it is mobilized (Canovan, 1999, p. 4; Moffit & Tormey, 2013, p. 381). A significant 
aspect of populism is personalism and the figure of a charismatic leader. This leader, 
presented as a messiah, usually asserts himself before the masses as the savior of the country, 
establishing an emotional connection with the electorate that expects a catharsis of the 
political system and the solution of unsatisfied social demands (Laclau, 2005). The 
“quintessence” of populism is popular mobilization based on personal attraction, since 
populist mobilization manages to assert itself as “the personification of the people:” 
By developing a personalistic electoral vehicle, without being linked to a strong political 
organization, the populist leader can present himself as a clean agent, fit to be the voice 
of the ‘common man’, since there are no intermediaries between him and the people 
(Mudde & Kaltawasser, 2017, p. 61). 
As an ideology, populism arises in combination with other dense ideologies (full ideologies), 
sometimes so heterogeneous among themselves. The political scientists Cas Mudde and 
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defining the concept as: “a low-density ideology that sees society as ultimately divided into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and that 
politics should be the expression of the volonté général of the people” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 
2017, p. 18). Thus, populism lacks an ideology of its own, incorporating elements of other 
ideological currents, often quite dissimilar to each other: 
Unlike dense or total ideologies (e.g., fascism, liberalism, and socialism), low-density 
ideologies, such as populism, have a limited morphology, which appears necessarily tied 
to –and sometimes even juxtaposed– other ideologies. In fact, populism is almost always 
presented in conjunction with other ideological elements that appeal to a broader public 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 19). 
Already in the work of Ernesto Laclau we find the conceptualization of populism as a 
particular logic or form of political discursiveness. According to the Argentine author, 
populism is a “political discursivity” that refers or points to democratic demands antagonistic 
to the institutionalist system dominated by administrative logic: 
by populism we do not mean a type of movement - identifiable with a particular social 
base or ideological orientation - but a political logic. All attempts to find what is specific 
to populism in facts such as membership of the peasantry or small landowners, or 
resistance to economic modernization, or manipulation by marginalized elites are, as we 
have seen, essentially wrong: will always be overtaken by an avalanche of exceptions (2005, 
p. 150). 
The Argentine theorist argues that the centrality of the “people” as opposed to an external 
element that obstructs its objectives (Hameleers & Vliegenthart, 2020), is a minimal and 
defining element of populism, even if the concept is a “vague” or “imprecise” signifier” 
(Laclau, 2005, p. 67). Laclau claims, however, that it is precisely the vague or empty character 
of the expression “people” that makes populism such a powerful phenomenon: 
populism presupposes the division of the social scenario into two domains. This division 
presupposes the presence of some privileged signifiers that condense around themselves 
the signification of an entire antagonistic field (the “regime,” “the oligarchy,” “the 
dominant groups,” etc.) for the oppressed. Which of these signifiers will acquire this 
articulating role will obviously depend on a contextual history (2005, p. 114). 
In the author’s perspective, populism should be understood as a “political logic” (2005, p. 117) 
which invokes the supremacy of popular sovereignty, its political authority, against the 
administrative elites that have disappointed the expectations of the people. Laclau proposes 
the concept of social demand as a “minimum unit” for the occurrence of the populist political 
phenomenon. While the institutionalist discourse is dominated by the administrative logic 
that understands the demand as an individual request that may or may not be satisfied by the 
system, the populist discourse operates in an equivalential logic of articulation of unsatisfied 
and heterogeneous demands. The demands of the population initially flourish in isolation. If 
the system satisfies the initial demands, the problem ends there. But if the demand remains 
unsatisfied, individuals may realize that there are other equally unsatisfied demands, 
promoting an “articulation of unsatisfied demands” that affect different population groups. If 
the political system does not have the capacity to absorb all the demands, a “relationship of 
equivalence of unsatisfied demands” is established and a widening gulf separates the 
institutional system from the population, “germinating populism in an embryonic form” 
(2005, pp. 98-99). The articulation of unsatisfied demands –i.e., the accumulation of petitions, 
claims, social exclusions, by the population against the political system– generates an 
antagonism and a social space between “us-people” and “them-political power.” 
Thus, we already have two clear preconditions for populism: (1) the formation of an 
antagonistic internal border separating the “people” from the power; (2) an equivalential 
articulation of demands that makes the emergence of the “people” possible.” There is a third 
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precondition that does not really emerge until political mobilization has reached a higher 
level: the unification of these various demands –whose equivalence, up to that point, had not 
gone beyond a vague feeling of solidarity– into a stable system of significance (Laclau, 2005, 
p. 99). 
Other theoretical-empirical analyses interpret populism as a “political style” centered 
on a performative repertoire used to create a relationship between the people and the political 
subject. It is a conception centered on the communicative strategies of political leaders, 
particularly on the discursive elements that make possible the polarization between “us” and 
“them,” between the “pure people” and internal or external enemies, and on the direct 
communication strategies used (Canovan, 1999; Moffitt & Tormey, 2016). 
In this sense, populist communication consists of an anti-establishment or anti-elite 
evocation and “celebration” of the pure people of the heartland, an “imagined community” 
where, according to the populist discursive construction, the “pure people” reside (Bos, van 
der Brug & de Vreese, 2011, p. 187). Generally, the rhetoric used by populist leaders focuses on 
the perception of a state of crisis in need of repair. Therefore, the populist discourse is 
dramatized and performed by a discursive repertoire that appeals to a tension between 
antagonistic blocks, “friend” and “enemy,” the people and the elites or out-groups, through a 
simple, direct language, the language of the “common man.” It is important to note that the 
dichotomous division between “pure people” and the “others,” identified as internal or 
external enemies of the “pure people,” symbolically divides society into two groups. However, 
it should be noted that the category “others” does not always correspond to the elites of a 
country, since it can refer to “immigrants,” “ethnic minorities,” religious groups, economic or 
political elites and other social groups that provoke feelings of rejection in a given social 
context and that are, at some point, held responsible for social problems by populist rhetoric. 
If the symbolic division of society into two homogeneous but antagonistic groups is a 
necessary condition for the identification of populism, as is the criticism of the elites, political 
scientist Jan-Werner Müller adds another that we feel it is important to emphasize: 
antipluralism. In Müller’s view, populists, when in government, manifest three aspects: they 
seek to appropriate the state apparatus, resort to corruption and to “mass clientelism” 
–exchange of material benefits or bureaucratic favors in exchange for the political support of 
citizens who become “clients” of populists– and systematically strive to suppress civil society, 
justifying their behavior with anti-pluralistic attitudes, claiming that they alone represent the 
people. The author considers that populism is a danger to democracy, especially because the 
threats come from within democracy. The political actors who constitute the danger speak in 
the language of democratic values: “The danger is populism: a degraded form of democracy 
that promises to do good under the highest democratic ideals (‘Let the people rule!’)” (Müller, 
2017). 
Also Pappas considers populism to be a threat to contemporary democracies. According 
to the author, in order to be classified as populist, a party or politician must have two 
antagonistic characteristics: it needs to demonstrate loyalty to democracy and, also, to defend 
non-liberal tactics. In other words, populism is almost always labeled as illiberal, but 
sometimes it places itself in the democratic camp, especially because it adopts the electoral 
process to conquer power. Pappas considers populism as “democratic illiberalism,” –i.e., 
populism is always democratic, but never liberal. The author believes that contemporary 
democracies face various types of adversaries composed of political parties or movements 
that are defined by their opposition to one of the three pillars of post-1945 European politics: 
democratic representation; a gradual process of further European integration; and political 
liberalism. 
I call anti-democratic to the enemies of democratic representation, the enemies of 
European integration, as nativist and the enemies of liberalism, as populist (Pappas, 2017, 
p. 18). 
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Populism is, according to the author’s thinking, a threat precisely because it can lead to the 
decay of liberal institutions and the consolidation of an illiberal system, as well as having a 
contagious characteristic, since the emergence of a populist party tends to lead other parties 
in a country in a populist direction. Populism, which is the counterpart and negation of 
political liberalism, is the most threatening adversary. It thrives where political institutions, 
especially the rule of law and safeguards for minority rights, are weak and where polarization 
and majoritarian tendencies are strong. In such environments, populist parties must achieve 
power through elections and even re-elect themselves (Pappas, 2017, pp. 37-38). 
As we can see, populism is a polysemic term, whose origin goes back to revolutionary 
movements that took place in the middle of the 19th century in Russia, against the privileges 
of the nobility, and in the United States, at the end of the same century, with the formation of 
the so-called People’s Party (The People’s Party). It is an imprecise category that has been used 
both to characterize political movements that claim to return power to the people, fighting 
against the elites (“We are transferring power from Washington DC and giving it back to you, 
the people,” Donald Trump emphasized at his inauguration as 45th President of the United 
States)1, or to refer to the socialist policies of the so-called left turn in Latin American politics. 
Thus, for the reasons explained above, it is more appropriate to speak of populism due to the 
malleability and porosity of the phenomenon. In the European context, populism is often 
associated with extremist, nationalist, anti-immigration, and Eurosceptic movements. 
Indeed, despite being a term frequently used in partisan struggles and in the media field, its 
topicality and ambiguity call for a sharper discussion. Despite ideological differences, 
contemporary populisms of right and left share the same agonistic and conflictual vision of 
politics, a friend-enemy, people-elites binary perspective, the understanding of the people as 
a “unified political subject,” and a “unified political subject” (Waisbord, 2018a, p. 23), and a 
problematic relationship with the principles of liberal democracies, such as the plurality of 
identity formation and political action and the existence of a public space open to negotiation 
and the formation of a public opinion built on discursive and egalitarian bases. 
2. Far-right, nationalism and Euroskepticism: the growth of populism in Europe 
In the last decades, some democracies have faced intense challenges and conflicting internal 
forces that, in many cases, have had consequences in shaping the political spectrum of these 
countries. Indeed, populism, due to its characteristic porosity, flourishes in new social 
movements or partisan organizations that defend nationalist or nativist causes, or xenophobic 
attitudes against the so-called out-groups in quite significant sectors of society. And, as can 
easily be seen, the implementation of economically austere policies in several European 
countries, together with the migratory crisis caused by the wars in North Africa and the 
Middle East, have accentuated specific forms of populism related to more radical political 
manifestations. Some of these movements, categorized as belonging to the far right, are 
inspired by conservative and reactionary ideologies, advocating public policies or opinions 
that are generally ignored or even silenced by governments, political parties, and the 
hegemonic media (Mazzoleni, 2003, p. 4). 
They are movements or political parties that address themselves directly to the “pure 
people,” claiming a political legitimacy that comes from the nativist “people” and national 
identity. In France, the Front National of Marine Le Pen is running “au nom du peuple”; in Italy, 
Matteo Salvini, of La Lega party, seeks to combat immigration by putting the Italian people 
first (“prima la nostra gente”); in Spain, Santiago Abascal’s party, VOX, proposes to combat the 
promotion of ideological views and suppress aid to illegal immigrants; and in Portugal, André 
Ventura of the Chega party condemns the opening of European borders to immigrants and 
 
1 Part of Donald Trump’s speech against the establishment, exalting the status of the people of the heartland: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BkNcelgx_ZM. 
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calls on the Portuguese to fight against Islamism. In general, far-right populist movements 
tend to concentrate their strategy on a few issues, but socially controversial issues with low 
public perception, such as immigration, national security, criminality, and political 
corruption. The exploitation of issues that arouse emotions in the electorate, the exploitation 
of social problems that generate alarm among the population, the mobilization of resentment 
against immigrants, or the defense of strong “law and order” policies, are the most common 
themes of the recent “populist moment” of the far right: 
In response to frustrations with the effects of old and new transformations in European 
politics and society, especially European integration and immigration, far-right populist 
parties have emerged across the continent, albeit with varying levels of electoral success. 
These parties combine populism with two other ideologies: authoritarianism and 
nativism. The first of these refers to the belief in a strictly regulated society and is 
expressed in an emphasis on matters of law and order; the second refers to the notion 
that states should be inhabited exclusively by elements of the native group (the nation) 
and that the non-native elements (foreigners) are a threat to the homogeneous nation-
state (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 50). 
By exploiting social pathologies or anomalies, such as political corruption, unemployment, 
criminality and other issues that provoke insecurity and a sense of risk among the population, 
the new populist movements generally promote a campaign to save the country or to promote 
a profound regeneration of political institutions. Populism was practically absent from the 
European political spectrum during the first decades of the post-war period. The 
consequences of fascism and totalitarianism led Europe to rebuild the foundations of its 
democracies in a moderate and distrustful manner in the face of the exaltations of political 
leaders and excessively personalistic and nationalistic leaderships. Indeed, it is only since the 
1990s that populist political forces have begun to assert themselves in Europe, especially in 
response to immigration and to certain effects resulting from the integration of countries into 
the European project. They are political parties or movements that combine the porosity of 
populism with nativist and nationalist principles, establishing a division between the 
members belonging to the nation, the nativists, and the members that constitute a threat to 
the social balance, the foreigners or immigrants. 
is not surprising, since populism in Western Europe has often been expressed by parties 
characterised by a nationalism and culturally conservative ideology, and hostility towards 
immigration and multiculturalism. The European academic literature has therefore also 
mainly considered populism as an element of the right (van Kessel, 2015, p. 2). 
This is the case of the French political party, Front National, created in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le 
Pen and which contested the second round of the presidential election in 2017 under the 
leadership of Marine Le Pen, from UKIP, the United Kingdom Independence Party, whose 
leading figure is Nigel Farage, a supporter of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European 
Union, and the Italian party Lega Nord, currently La Lega, founded by regionalists from 
northern Italy and which in the 2018 elections was the third most voted party. In Spain, the 
recent political party VOX, founded in 2013 by dissidents of the Partido Popular, also imposes 
itself against immigration, especially Muslim immigration, and charges against the traditional 
parties, identified with the privileged elite. In fact, in recent decades, national populism has 
experienced a slow but steady growth in European society, reaching more than 14% of the 
popular vote in the Old Continent according to the Authoritarian Populism Index. 
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Graph 1: European electoral support for far-right populist parties. 
 
Source: Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index. 
The economic crisis of 2008, which led to the implementation of austerity measures, 
especially in the countries of the South, nevertheless led to the emergence of radical left-wing 
populist parties such as Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, La France Insoumise in France 
and Die Linke in Germany. Indeed, the populist far left has improved its electoral results 
considerably, especially in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. These left-wing parties tend to 
be Euroskeptic, as are the far-right parties, but more for economic reasons than for political 
reasons, as they argue that the austerity measures implemented by the European Central 
Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund, the Troika, have 
increased social inequality and poverty in many European countries (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 
2017, p. 54). 
3. Media populism: collaboration or neutralization of the populist threat? 
Some authors have researched how the action of the media, especially the tabloid media, is 
involved in the emergence of populist movements (Deacon & Wring, 2016; Mazzoleni, 2003). 
The media tend to give news coverage to events that represent a certain break with the 
regularity of everyday life, and populist, emotive and disruptive messages challenge the status 
quo and the pre-established order. By provoking social order and breaking with the 
homeostasis of the system, populist messages end up deserving wide media coverage, 
especially when they are a novelty in the political marketplace. Stewart et al. suggest that the 
sensationalist media play a particularly important role in the publicity of a new populist party, 
engaging, without any “moral ambivalence,” with its themes, discourses and values, while the 
mainstream media tend to ignore the sensational aspects of these parties (2003, p. 225). 
The sensationalist media often serve as a privileged stage for populist movements, 
contributing to the dissemination of their messages and guaranteeing a certain “media 
legitimacy” essential in political disputes against internal and external enemies. On the other 
hand, and once the media of reference are normally part of the elites of a country, if the 
populist movement seriously confronts the establishment, the media of reference will be able 
to “use all the arsenal at their disposal to combat and neutralize the populist threat” 
(Mazzoleni, 2003, p. 7). 
Populism finds more sympathetic media coverage with media prone to infotainment. 
Populist movements and, above all, the personality traits of political leaders that provoke a 
certain break with politically correct discourse, are an appetizing journalistic product for the 
tabloid press, for television talk shows and other products that make up politainment. 
Personalization, novelization, dramatization and spectacularization of the facts are 
characteristics of the media logic that are combined with the discursive strategies of pop 
politics, so used by many populist leaders. According to a study conducted by researchers at 
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Queen Mary University of London, individuals overexposed to entertainment television 
programs are more likely to vote for populist candidates (Durante, Pinotti & Tesei, 2019). 
Portuguese politician, André Ventura, elected as a deputy for the anti-establishment 
Chega party in the 2019 elections, is an example of the role of the tabloid media in promoting 
populist politicians. A sports and justice affairs commentator on Correio da Manhã, the 
channel with the highest cable television audience, Ventura has gained considerable media 
visibility, also for his controversial comments on television programs and in the newspaper 
with the highest penetration in Portuguese society, Correio da Manhã. In fact, the 2019 
elections correspond to the moment when, for the first time, an anti-establishment far-right 
party breaks into the Portuguese Parliament. 
In the relationship of populism to the media, a distinction is often made when 
considering populism by the media (populism by the media), or media populism, or populism 
through the media (populism for or through the media) (Esser et al., 2017). In the first case, the 
media explicitly participates in the construction of populism, assuming a critical attitude 
towards power holders and representing the “common man in the street.” In an exasperated 
and activist way, this would be based on some of the same principles of populist 
communication by some political actors. In the second case, populism through the media, the 
focus is less on the media as actors per se and more on the content and the programs they 
broadcast. In this approach, populist actors and ideas receive disproportionate media 
attention because their focus on negativity, on conflict, on dramatization, resonates well with 
today’s media logic (Hameleers & Vliegenthart, 2020). By providing a forum for actors using 
populist communication, the media help spread their messages and increase the visibility and 
legitimacy of these actors (de Vreese et al., 2018, p. 429). As Mazzoleni emphasizes, “the media, 
intentionally or not, can serve as powerful mobilization tools for populist causes” (2008, p. 
50). 
However, although we can consider the mainstream press to be closer to the elites and 
the status quo, media populism is not exclusive to the tabloids and the media products typical 
of the so-called showbiz journalism. In fact, the coverage of political events is influenced by 
the productive routines (news making) of the media and by the media logic through certain 
frames or explanatory frames of events that impose a certain definition of social and political 
movements (Entman, 1993). Both the agenda setting theory and the framing theory attribute 
to the media a relevant capacity to influence public attitudes and opinions. Thus, when 
populist rhetoric resonates in the press and in news and commentary on policy developments, 
it is predictable that frames favorable or unfavorable to that rhetoric will influence the 
public’s perception of populist actors. In the discursive struggle for the establishment of 
explanatory narratives of social events, two types of frames are generally confronted: populist 
leaders, challengers of the establishment, try to promote a picture of injustice in need of 
redress or reform; the challenged authorities or elites, on the other hand, respond with the 
need to promote respect for institutions, the law and social order (Mazzoleni, 2003). 
While populist leaders instigate feelings of indignation, exploring the politics of emotions 
and sensations, dramatizing social events, and occupying emotional spaces, traditional 
political institutions and ideologies have some difficulty in coping with the emotional 
discharges of citizens, especially in times of crisis and social contestation. On the other hand, 
once the logic of the media was colonized by commercial imperatives, populist leaders 
acquired the capacity to respond to the dramatization and showmanship impulses of the 
media. Populist movements seek to adapt their rhetoric to the demands of informative logic, 
manufacturing facts and speeches with the aim of satisfying certain journalistic values or 
criteria, such as the rupture of the regularity of daily life and the dramatization of events, 
adapting perfectly to the commercial objectives of the media industry (Krämer, 2014; 
Mazzoleni, 2008). 
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4. The rise of digital populism 
The populist leader usually avoids the institutions of social intermediation, seeking direct 
contact with the people. Today, populist leaders use direct communication strategies, largely 
supported by digital communication mechanisms, to appeal to the people without 
intermediaries. The Internet and the networked communication that characterizes it have led 
to a decentralization of communication processes, allowing individual poles outside the media 
and political elites and agents in the field of journalism to disseminate messages that escape 
the control of traditional mediators. As McQuail underlines: 
The main advantage is easy access for all those who want to speak without the mediation 
of the powerful that control press content and broadcast channels. It is not necessary to 
be rich or powerful to have a presence on the World Wide Web (2003, p. 140). 
It is a type of communication that, benefiting from the network, can reach an infinite audience 
but, on the other hand, is within the reach of any individual. The web. 2.0 breaks with the 
traditional paradigm of gatekeeping, allowing political leaders and citizens to contact each 
other directly by replicating, in the network communication, messages often to be filtered. 
Now, each individual can, by dispensing with journalistic mediation, access the public sphere, 
condition media agendas and topics of discussion and interact in the local and global networks 
of digital communication that characterize the network society. As Castells emphasizes, “it is 
mass communication because it can potentially reach a global audience, as when a video is 
posted on YouTube, a blog with RSS links. It is self-communication because one generates the 
message oneself, defines the possible recipients and selects the specific messages” (2009, p. 
88). 
Indeed, the communication model of the network has altered the processes and 
strategies of political communication and the new populist political movements or parties 
manage it perfectly. Jair Bolsonaro’s 2018 campaign illustrates the use of direct 
communication and the network model by the new populist movements. The Internet was 
intentionally chosen by the Partido Social Liberal candidate as the main public arena for 
challenging the Brazilian status quo, that is, the dominant political class and the agenda of the 
traditional media. If, in a short time, Bolsonaro became the main Brazilian political force, 
imposing himself in the 2018 elections, the fact cannot be dissociated from the digital culture 
that characterizes the movement, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, from the 
exploration of the ethical revolt against the political establishment, especially against the 
progressive movements of the left. On the other hand, the network functions as a powerful 
replicator of content produced by institutions, political leaders, professional actors or 
citizens, stimulating interpersonal communication and the production of viral and memetic 
content. This means that messages can circulate to an extraordinarily wide audience, and this 
applies, of course, to unfiltered messages that may have been produced to manipulate public 
opinion. In this sense, digital populism reveals another dynamic relationship between the 
media, particularly social networks, and political actors: the manipulation and disinformation 
strategies used by some neopopulist movements. 
The decentralized model of the web 2.0 has become an important tool for political 
parties, either for traditional political parties, or for new political movements or digital 
parties, those parties with exponential growth due to digital affordances. However, in recent 
years, especially after the leak of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which has made public 
how Facebook user data was used for political propaganda based on disinformation and 
targeting strategies, several researchers have drawn a parallel between digital social 
networks, the business model of the web 2.0 and the mechanics of the new populist 
movements. While some speak of an “elective affinity” between digital social networks and 
populism (Gerbaudo, 2018; Waisbord, 2018), other authors highlight some special features of 
social networks that help build networked populist mechanics (Cesarino, 2020; Maly, 2018). 
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5. Digital populism and disinformation: the “alternative facts” factories 
The propagandistic use of the media has always been one of the concerns of political leaders 
and, therefore, it is not surprising that the media, in particular the so-called new media of the 
Internet, have become an obscure object of desire for the populist mechanics and political 
propaganda of these movements. Contemporary populism is staged through a discursive 
repertoire built on the ruins of the collapse of the traditional legitimacy of representative 
politics, the decline of ideologies and citizens’ distrust of social institutions, including the 
media. It is in this context that personalist and charismatic leaders emerge who seek to 
exercise political power, or to have some influence on the exercise of political power, through 
the unmediated and non-institutionalized support of a large number of followers, followers 
who nowadays are manifested through digital communication and who replicate network 
messages that escape the control and framing of traditional media. 
While mass media adhere to professional standards and news values, social media serve 
as a direct link to the people and allow populists to bypass the gatekeepers of journalism. In 
this way, social media provide populists with the freedom to articulate their ideology and 
disseminate their messages in an uncontested manner (Engesser et al., 2017, p. 1110). 
The risks for democratic communication become evident. By systematically doubting the 
news, especially when the news questions the populist rhetoric or messages disseminated by 
these movements, and by contacting “the people” in an unmediated way, directly inducing 
their propagandistic messages, digital populism often resorts to strategies of disinformation 
and manipulation of reality. Mechanisms that, due to the preponderance of the digital, 
decentralized environment and without the mediation of the once “guardians of the public 
interest,” the gatekeepers, seem to have been perfected. Thinking specifically about the digital 
environment and the types of false content circulating on the web, Wardle and Derakhshan 
distinguish between “dis-information,” “mis-information,” and “bad-information.” 
Disinformation can be defined as intentional manipulation of information with the clear 
intention of misleading the public. In other words, individuals are aware of the false character 
of an information and disseminate it with the deliberate purpose of manipulating public 
opinion and causing some kind of damage. Mis-information also refers to false content, as in 
the case of dis-information, but without the intention of causing harm or alarm. Finally, bad-
information includes real information, but disseminated with the clear objective of causing 
harm to a person or organization, as happens, for example, in hate speeches against certain 
groups (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). 
 
Figure 1: Information disorder model in the digital environment. 
 
Source: Council of Europe Report. 
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Observing the referendum that resulted in the process known as Brexit and some recent 
electoral events, particularly the 2016 American and 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, we 
note that disinformation and manipulation have become one of the main political 
communication strategies used by some populist movements. The media, particularly 
modern digital social networks, are currently a major player in the process of manufacturing 
and disseminating disinformation tactics that nevertheless become socially accepted facts by 
citizens, especially by those citizens most emotionally involved with the messages and with 
populist movements. By enabling direct communication practices that dispense with the 
traditional mediation of gatekeepers, platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter or 
WhatsApp are privileged means of contemporary political communication, allowing the 
establishment of communication flows between political leaders and citizens, creating 
horizontal communication networks where all types of information circulate, including 
information to be filtered, false or distorted, driven by algorithms, and with clear purposes of 
political instrumentalization. 
Different actors in the media, politics or society can disseminate (mis)information 
without the interference of media elites and journalistic routines such as verification, 
accuracy and balance. Political actors can use social networks to share their distrust of the 
media and the institutions of democracy, regardless of the factual basis of their claims. Geert 
Wilders in the Netherlands and Donald Trump in the United States are two influential cases 
in point (Hameleers, 2020, p. 147). 
Digital social networks offer politicians, parties and new social movements the possibility 
and freedom to disseminate their messages and ideologies. In this sense, contemporary 
populist movements flourished, on the one hand, in a historical period marked by economic 
crises and a strong response to these crises, a response that led to the erosion of traditional 
representative democracies and, on the other hand, in an era marked by the emergence of 
new technological platforms that altered the way individuals communicate and share their 
visions of the world. The rise of “digital populism” needs, in fact, to be framed as a product of 
these transformations that have created the conditions for populist movements to appeal to 
unsatisfied and digitally networked voters (Gerbaudo, 2018). 
On the other hand, and due to the distrust of many citizens in relation to the hegemonic 
media, social media platforms assert themselves as a suitable channel for populist rhetoric to 
be heard and for citizens to express their indignation towards political elites and traditional 
institutions of mediation. Thus, digital media offer populist movements the possibility of 
using alternative news channels to promote and disseminate an anti-establishment 
discourse, fostering the necessary citizen mobilization of the populist support base. 
Alternative news and political discussion channels, such as Breitbart News, co-founded by 
Steve Bannon, or the fake news site InfoWars, one of Donald Trump’s favorite news sites in 
the 2016 campaign, prove this trend. 
Four opportunity structures of Facebook and Twitter foster the potential for populist 
communication: they offer the possibility of establishing a close connection with the people, 
they provide direct access to the public without journalistic interventions, they can create a 
sense of community and recognition among otherwise dispersed groups, and they foster the 
potential for personalization (Ernst et al., 2019, p. 5). 
6. Populism’s affinity with post-truth politics 
Changes in the conditions or in the spaces where politics takes place, transformations in the 
processes of political mediation, offer, in fact, new opportunities for participation and public 
visibility, but also new risks and even new performative practices of politics and its actors. 
The new populisms raise questions in the relationship of politics with the media, but also a 
new framework for the relationship of politics with truth. Considered word of the year 2016 
by the Oxford Dictionaries, post-truth denotes circumstances in which objective facts are less 
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influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotions and personal beliefs (Oxford 
University Press, 2017). According to the Diccionario de la Real Academia de la Lengua Española, 
post-truth is understood as “deliberate distortion of a reality, which manipulates beliefs and 
emotions in order to influence public opinion and social attitudes”2. It is an “emotional lie” 
aimed at distorting reality and shaping public opinion. 
After the Referendum on the United Kingdom’s stay in the European Union and the 2016 
U.S. presidential election campaign, the words “post-truth” and “fact-alternatives” entered 
the lexicon of the discussion on media and populism to refer to a certain erosion of factuality 
and a new relationship of political actors and citizens with the truth. What is understood by 
truth and factuality became, in fact, the object of discussions and reinterpretations, especially 
because the notion of truth became anchored in particular interests and everything that does 
not agree with those interests, with partisan or ideological visions, became disqualified 
independently of the verification of facts, objectivity and the principle of reality. 
Hannah Arendt had already denounced that “truth and politics have always been in a bad 
relationship” (2006, p. 27), as well as the massive manipulation of facts and opinions in which 
the media play a preponderant role. Noam Chomsky himself included the media in the set of 
systems that produce corporate propaganda, denouncing a certain “systemic bias” of the 
media in the service of economic and corporate interests of “manufacturing consensus” 
(2005). Thus, post-truth should not be confused with mere disinformation or manipulation of 
public opinion, concepts that have a long history in political thought. 
The discussion on post-truth refers to a time in which facts are ignored and emotions and 
beliefs are imposed on the factual events or facts considered “objective,” especially due to the 
way they are propagated, repeated or “viralized” in the digital media. Beliefs or information 
to be verified are considered credible and are often disseminated as covert political 
propaganda. It refers, on the one hand, to circumstances in which facts are less influential in 
shaping public perception of events than beliefs or emotions. When the facts of the world do 
not agree with the mental frames of individuals, the facts are rejected and the frames prevail, 
linguist George Lakoff would say in Don´t think of an Elephant. 
People think through frames [...] For truth to be accepted it has to fit into people’s frames. 
If the facts do not fit into a certain frame, the frame holds and the facts bounce (2007, p. 
16). 
On the other hand, post-truth defines a time where the centralized devices of propaganda 
production and falsifications of reality, whose Ministry of Truth in the Orwellian newspeak is 
the most eloquent metaphor, gave way to a multiplication of decentralized and fragmented 
devices of production of falsehoods and alternative narratives about the events of the world. 
In The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life, Ralph Keyes points out 
that in the post-truth era, there are hardly any more truths or lies, but rather a third category 
of ambiguous and dubious statements that do not correspond exactly to the truth but are too 
“soft” to be called lies (2004, p. 15). In Keyes’ perspective, post-truth exists in an ethically gray 
zone that allows people to dissemble without being seen as dishonest, since lies are almost 
always presented as just another narrative about reality, as another version or “alternative 
fact.” It does not matter whether the “stories” or narratives shared are true or false, since the 
subjects are only interested in confirming and sharing a certain vision of the world, a vision 
that is in accordance with their preconceptions, stereotypes, attitudes, or beliefs3. 
Thus, post-truth has become a visible political strategy in many electoral campaigns of 
populist leaders, and it is not by chance that it is related to the proliferation of falsehoods and 
 
2 https://dle.rae.es/?id=TqpLe0m. 
3 The expression “alternative facts” was used by Kellyanne Conway, counselor to President Donald Trump, to defend 
the White House narrative that Donald Trump’s inauguration had no less of an audience than the inauguration of his 
predecessor, Barack Obama. 
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rumors. Because of the appeal to emotions and the way they are “manufactured” and 
disseminated in the digital media, fake news is essentially post-truth. While it is true that fake 
news and rumors have existed since the emergence of the press, it is also true that the digital 
era has created the conditions for their widespread dissemination and diffusion. We refer to 
false information intentionally designed to mislead or manipulate the public, using 
techniques specific to the field of journalism, techniques that give them apparent veracity and 
factuality: “we define ‘fake news’ as news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, 
and that could mislead readers” (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017, p. 213). They are essentially 
emotionally appealing contents, which arouse the public’s attention because they cause some 
kind of sensation, reinforcing political and ideological ideals. They are, above all, 
disseminated in digital social networks and sponsored by political propaganda and by the so-
called “click industry” and commercial advertising. The digital world has created more 
facilities for the production and dissemination of content related to parody, rumorology and 
political or economic interests. 
There are two main motivations for the production of fake news. The first is economic: 
news articles that go viral on social networks can generate significant advertising revenue 
when users click through to the original site […]. The second motivation is ideological. Some 
producers of fake news seek to promote the candidates they support (Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017, p. 217). 
Often it is the populist political leaders themselves who are responsible for spreading 
false, manipulative, or distorted content. In the 2017 Dutch election campaign, anti-Muslim 
leader Geert Wilders, has posted on his Twitter feed a doctored photo where he places a 
political rival, Alexander Pechtold, at a rally calling for the imposition of Islamic law in the 
Netherlands. 
 
Figure 2: Wilders tweets a fake photo (left) to link a rival with Islamists. 
 
Source: El País, 8 February 2017. 
In an investigation into exposure to fake news during the US presidential election, Andrew 
Guess, Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler concluded that 1 in 4 Americans had visited pages 
with suspicious, biased or false content during the election, pages mostly powered by 
Facebook and with a pronounced pro-Trump stance (Guess, Nyhan & Reifler, 2018). In fact, 
data from a Pew Research Center report indicates that 23% of Americans admit to having 
shared a made-up news story at some point during the election and 14% said they shared a 
story they knew to be false. Indeed, top fake content about the U.S. election generated higher 
engagement on Facebook than top election stories from the top 19 media outlets. During the 
critical campaign period, 20 fake news stories about the election posted on blogs and partisan 
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In 2018, fake news has also occupied the political and media agenda of the Brazilian 
presidential election. In a political spectrum where television advertising has always been a 
determining factor, the ultra-right-wing Jair Bolsonaro, who in the first round had only 8 
seconds of television advertising, was the only one to have been able to get the most out of his 
campaign, and without the support of a major political party, he focused his strength on digital 
media, particularly WhatsApp, a platform that has more than 120 million users in Brazil, 
according to data from the platform itself. The conservative candidate of the Partido Social 
Liberal (Social Liberal Party) did not participate in electoral debates during the second round 
of the elections and gave virtually no television interviews. In terms of political 
communication in the Brazilian case, the innovation has to do with the use of the users of 
digital media themselves as replicators of the propagandistic content and of the candidate’s 
statements disseminated on digital platforms. In the digital political battle, Bolsonaro’s 
campaign has not shied away from using false information as disguised political propaganda. 
The far-right candidate accused his opponent, the candidate of the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT), Fernando Haddad, of being responsible for the creation of school material to “sexualize 
children” and teach “gender ideology” in Brazil, which he called gay kit, one of the main fake 
news disseminated in the presidential campaign, with more than 580 thousand engagements 
in social networks in the month of the elections (Jardelino, Barboza Cavalcanti & Persici 
Toniolo, 2020). 
An IDEA/Big Data Avaaz poll noted that 83.7% of Jair Bolsonaro’s voters believed the 
information that Haddad distributed the gay kit for children in schools when he was education 
minister5. 
 
Figure 3: The so-called gay kit program by Jair Bolsonaro never saw the light of day in 
public schools. It refers to the project called School without Homophobia that sought 
to train teachers in LGTB rights to prevent violence and promote respect for diversity 
among young people and adolescents. 
 
Source: Veja Review, 31 July 20. 
Supporters of the ultra-conservative candidate used digital media, especially WhatsApp and 
Facebook, as a real disinformation machine to spread these and other false news stories. 
Journalists from El País6 monitored for three weeks pages and online mobilization groups 
supporting the Partido Social Liberal (PSL) candidate, and verified the dissemination of lies 
camouflaged as news, false celebrity endorsements of Jair Bolsonaro’s campaign and 
propaganda videos that sought to disprove news unfavorable to his campaign, creating a 
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Brazilian elections saw an organized information war within WhatsApp, in which false 
rumors, manipulated photos, decontextualized videos and audio hoaxes, became campaign 
ammunition and went viral on the platform with no way to control their reach or origin 
(Resende et al., 2019, p. 1). 
7. Final considerations 
The relationships between digital populism and post-truth politics raise questions related to 
new mechanisms of fraud and falsification of reality that must be interpreted through the 
collapse of gatekeeping and the emergence of new forms of mediation based on the new digital 
ecosystem. It is in this sense that the politics of post-truth establishes a close “affinity” with 
the communication strategies of populist leaders (Waisbord, 2018b, p. 14). 
For populism, facts are not neutral entities that can be checked, verified, or contrasted 
outside the frameworks of interpretation and knowledge. Facts are neither supreme and 
unquestionable phenomena nor constitutive elements of truth. On the contrary, facts are 
subsidiary to the narratives of predetermined visions of politics, of the clash between popular 
and elite interests, and of ideological worldviews (Waisbord, 2018b, p. 10). 
Political polarization, the emergence of alternative political and media movements, the 
demagogy and rhetoric of recent populist movements have found in online communication, 
particularly in digital social networking sites, a “sounding board” for the dissemination of 
their messages and anti-system speeches, appealing to the “people” without intermediaries. 
By promoting direct communication with and among the “people,” stimulating feelings of 
outrage against the elites and against the political establishment, populist rhetoric feeds on 
communicative flows without the traditional mediation of organic agents in the field of 
journalism. 
Thus, modern political lies, such as disinformation strategies, image manipulation and 
the profusion of “alternative facts,” resist the assault on truth and objectivity in a completely 
new way. If it is true that, as Hannah Arendt forcefully pointed out, truth and politics have 
always been in a bad relationship (Arendt, 2006), the current populist rhetoric has ended up 
relativizing the importance of truth and facts in the public debate characteristic of the 
network society. Recent populist phenomena, especially related to the growth of the far right, 
are problematic for democratic communication. The conflict between the communication 
strategies of some of these movements, such as the use of post-truth politics, disinformation 
and lies, or the use of junk news as a form of propaganda, and the structuring principles of 
the media field, such as the search for truth, respect for the facts, freedom of the press and 
the independence of journalism from the pressures of political power, is visible. If populism 
exposes the crisis of liberal democracies and citizens’ distrust of political institutions, some 
contemporary populist movements reveal problems related to the expansion of digital 
communication. The decentralization of communication processes caused by the impact of 
networked communication, the irruption of digital social networks and the exponential 
growth of mobile communication users, particularly smartphones, created the ideal context 
for certain populist movements to use strategies characteristic of the so-called post-truth era. 
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